On August 21, 2026, the U.S. District Court for the Southern District of New York issued a decision granting partial summary judgment to the plaintiffs in CLINIC v. Rubio, vacating and declaring unlawful the Department of State (DOS)’s policy that has required consular officers to pause all immigrant visa issuances to nationals of designated 75 countries (“the Policy”).[1]
Background
In January 2026, DOS, acting at the direction of Secretary Marco Rubio, issued a cable directing consular officers to pause all immigrant visa issuances to nationals of certain designated countries, effective January 21, 2026. DOS justified the Policy on public charge grounds, labeling nationals of the affected countries as being at “High Risk of Public Charge.”
The Policy went far beyond an ordinary public charge determination. Under the Immigration and Nationality Act (INA), public charge eligibility is decided through an individualized, case-by-case assessment of factors such as age, health, family status, finances, and education. Under the Policy, however, consular officers were instructed to pause visa issuances on nationality alone — even where the consular officer had found no basis for inadmissibility under the law.
Plaintiffs — including the Catholic Legal Immigration Network (CLINIC), African Communities Together (ACT), U.S. citizens petitioning for family members, and intending immigrants from countries including Colombia, Ethiopia, Ghana, Guatemala, and Jamaica — filed suit on February 2, 2026, challenging the Policy under the Administrative Procedure Act (APA). Several plaintiffs had already had their visa issuances refused at consular interviews, with refusal notices expressly citing the Policy.
The Court’s Ruling
The Court first held that the claims were properly before it. Applying the D.C. Circuit’s reasoning in Pietersen v. U.S. Department of State, the Court found that the consular nonreviewability doctrine does not bar judicial review of forward-looking challenges to policies governing consular decisions. The Court also found that the Policy constituted final agency action, and that all plaintiffs had standing: U.S. citizen plaintiffs suffered the quintessential injury of being kept separated from relatives abroad, while intending immigrant plaintiffs suffered the “lost opportunity” to receive an immigrant visa.
On the merits, the Court held that the Policy violated the APA in multiple respects:
1. Violation of the INA’s Anti-Discrimination Provision (Section 1152(a)(1)(A)): The Court found that the Policy directly contravenes the INA’s command that “no person shall receive any preference or priority or be discriminated against in the issuance of an immigrant visa because of the person’s race, sex, nationality, place of birth, or place of residence.” The Court traced this provision to the 1965 reforms that abolished the nationality-based quota system, and rejected the Government’s reliance on Trump v. Hawaii, explaining that unlike the presidential proclamation in Hawaii — which operated on admissibility — the Policy here regulates visa issuance itself.
2. Violation of Section 1201(g): Section 1201(g) permits refusal of a visa only where the applicant is ineligible under the INA or the application otherwise fails to comply with the law. The Court held that the Policy — which mandates refusal of otherwise eligible applicants based solely on nationality — has no basis in law. The Court rejected the Government’s argument that refusals under the Policy rest on “existing” authority as, in its words, “an exercise in Orwellian logic.”
3. Excess of Statutory Authority: The Court held that the Policy exceeds the statutory authority the INA vests in the Secretary of State, who lacks the authority to control which visa applications consular officers grant or deny — yet the Policy asserts control over an incredibly broad class of immigrant visa applications.
4. Public Charge Claim Rejected: The Court declined to hold that the Policy violates the public charge provision, Section 1182(a)(4), finding that the Policy preserves the individualized public charge framework rather than displacing it.
5. Notice-and-Comment Claim Rejected: The Court also rejected the plaintiffs’ claim that the Policy was a “legislative rule” requiring notice and comment rulemaking, concluding that it did not create new law, rights, or duties binding outside the agency.
Final Ruling and Remedy
The Court vacated the Policy in full and awarded declaratory judgment, restoring the prior status quo. It emphasized that vacatur extends only to visa denials based on the Policy itself — not to consular refusals based on any other independent ground of ineligibility. The Court declined to remand to the agency, finding this a “rare” case where the legal errors are clear and no further agency deliberation could cure them.
Pause on Immigrant Visa Interviews Worldwide: DOS’s compliance with the court decision is now in dispute. Days after the ruling, the Department paused immigrant visa interviews worldwide for Public Charge training; on August 26, plaintiffs filed an emergency motion arguing the pause is really the vacated policy under another name.
The government retains the discretion to appeal, and a further battle in the courts is likely: the emergency motion remains pending, and a separate, stricter public charge rule takes effect September 18, 2026. But for now, consular officers may no longer pause immigrant visa issuances solely because of an applicant’s nationality.
Related Blog:
DOS Pauses Immigrant Visa Issuances for 75 Countries
Public Charge Inadmissibility Under the 2026 Final Rule: A Guide to Form I-485 Adjudication
[1] CLINIC v. Rubio, et al., No. 26-cv-00858 (JAV) (S.D.N.Y. Aug. 21, 2026).
Questions about how this affects your case? I handle immigrant visa matters nationwide, in English and Japanese — and respond to every inquiry within one business day.
English 
Japanese